Sanctions: Ineffective Economic Warfare

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 2024, pp. 63-64

Book Talks

THE CONTROVERSIAL subject of U.S. sanctions against Iran was the focus of a Feb. 15 online discussion hosted by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft (QI).

In their new book, How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare, authors Narges Bajoghli, Vali Nasr, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani and Ali Vaez argue that punishing sanctions against Iran have not only been unsuccessful, but counterproductive.

“We wanted to bring together a comprehensive study looking at the impact of sanctions not only economically…but also from the perspective of different sectors of society, both those that benefit from sanctions, including those connected to the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] and the supreme leader’s office, as well as those affected in adverse ways throughout the population,” Bajoghli, a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), said.

The growth of the black market under sanctions has resulted in the construction of new high-rise buildings and luxury malls for those who trade everything from foreign currency to medicine underground. Meanwhile, ordinary people who were once in the middle class are getting poorer every day, unable to access basic necessities at reasonable prices, Bajoghli explained. 

The black market has been given staying power and legitimacy by the realization that sanctions will likely remain in place for the short- to medium-term. “They stick, so therefore there is a vested interest now to create…infrastructure that allows for trade to happen away from the U.S. dollar,” Bajoghli said.

Sanctions, Nasr argued, have also made Iran “more aggressive, more nuclear, more dictatorial at home. On every indices that sanctions were supposed to work, they have had the opposite effect.”

The examples of Iran ramping up its aggression in response to sanctions are numerous, Nasr, also a professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS, argued. “They will build a nuclear program to force the United States to negotiate over sanctions. They will become involved in aggressive behavior in the region in order to force the United States back [to negotiations]. They insist on controlling Iraq in order to have outlets for Iran’s economy. Even if Iran is at the negotiating table…if you can’t or won’t lift sanctions those talks won’t go anywhere.”

In light of this, policymakers in Washington must discern the purpose of their sanctions, he urged: “Are they just punitive, are they for regime change or do they have a very specific goal in mind?” Nasr said the authors are “basically telling American policymakers that maybe it’s time for the United States to stop and pause and think.” 

Nasr believes the Iranians have learned they are not going to receive any concessions from the United States by behaving well or reducing nuclear centrifuges, particularly after the Trump administration dropped out of the 2015 nuclear deal, despite Iran’s compliance. He described Tehran’s philosophy as, “You’re only going to get a response from the United States by becoming bigger and more menacing.” 

This is the overarching problem with sanctions from a strategic perspective, Nasr argued. “It’s in that sense that sanctions have become completely counterproductive. So today we see an Iran that is far more dangerous in terms of its nuclear program than it was in 2015.”

—Elaine Pasquini