Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November/December 2021, pp. 38-39, 48
Special Report
By Mustafa Fetouri
TUNISIA, THE BIRTHPLACE and jewel of the so-called “Arab Spring,” is passing through its most difficult period with the potential to bring it back to where Libya, its eastern neighbor, was. A decade earlier Tunisia successfully moved into rebuilding its state institutions after the 2011 revolt: a new constitution was approved, free elections organized first in 2011 and, subsequently, on three other occasions. The opening of the first parliament, in a post-Zine El Abidine Ben Ali era, marked a new phase in which Tunisia appeared on course to become a shining example of success in the troubled North Africa region.
Libya’s revolt, on the other hand, went completely wrong from the start. It led to international and regional military interventions culminating, in March 2011, with NATO launching its eight-month air campaign, which eventually helped the rebels take control of the country and ushered in a decade of chaos, civil strife and destruction. While Ben Ali fled Tunisia and died in exile in Saudi Arabia, Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi fought back only to be murdered by the rebels, leading to further bloodshed. Unlike Tunisia, Libya’s institutions were weak and civil associations hardly existed. Instead, Libya has been a battle ground in which militias, terrorists and tribesmen, encouraged by different international actors, engage in sporadic fights bringing more misery and destruction to the once oil rich and safe country.
The United States and its allies, who helped destabilize Libya in 2011, watched hopelessly as the conflict raged and United Nations’ mediation efforts to end it went nowhere.
Between 2011 and 2020, Libya appeared beyond rescue while Tunisia seemed headed toward a future of democratic rule and stability. Tunisia’s 2014 openly contested presidential elections handed the top job to the veteran politician, Beji Caid Essebsi, who died in office in 2019. The democratic process was poised to complete a successful transition.
In the same year, Libya held its own free elections, but instead of stability the country slid into violence when a coalition of militias rejected the outcome of the polls and chased the elected parliament from the capital, Tripoli, to the far eastern city of Tobruk, for refuge. That war, sometimes referred to as the second civil war, divided the country: Tripoli and the western areas of Libya ended up under the control of U.N.-backed government while the eastern and southern regions were controlled by a parallel administration recognized by nobody. In eastern Libya, strongman Libyan-U.S. dual citizen Khalifa Haftar, commanding his self-styled army, became the dominant force. Haftar aligned himself with the Tobruk parliament, which appointed him commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces—sometimes referred to as the Libyan National Army.
In 2019, events in the two neighboring countries took unexpected turns.
Libya was already in the midst of its third civil war as commander Haftar forces encircled the capital Tripoli in an attempt to dislodge the U.N.-backed government. Despite the approval he received from then-U.S. President Donald Trump and his top security adviser, John Bolton, Haftar failed—thanks to Turkish military intervention in support of the Tripoli government. Haftar’s forces were chased away and a ceasefire agreement, brokered by the U.N., came into effect. The ceasefire created positive momentum and encouraged the U.N. to bring the different Libyan factions to the negotiation table.
In Tunisia, the people went to the polls again, after the death of President Essebsi. However, Tunisia’s democratic process descended into bickering, infighting and disagreements, bringing the state to a standstill. Televised parliamentary debates became a circus of discredited politicians. Disenchanted Tunisians grew poorer, angrier and more supportive of a political outsider, Kais Saied, who promised them a war on corruption, which he blamed for every ill in the country. On Oct. 23, 2019 Kais Saied, an unknown constitutional law professor, was sworn in as president.
Then came the terrible COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which has killed more than 25,000 Tunisians, stretched the health system to the limit, and brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Yet the country’s elected representatives continued their wrangling as if nothing was happening. Libya’s health authorities say the pandemic killed fewer than 5,000 people, so far, but the real figure is thought to be much higher. Different vaccines are now widely available, however many Libyans are reluctant to get vaccinated.
All that provided a perfect opportunity for President Saied to decide that the country has had enough and, as a hugely popular president, he had to act. He, repeatedly, warned the political elite to end their quarrels and take measures to salvage the country but nothing happened. On July 25, 2021, Saied acted in a surprising way: he suspended the parliament, dismissed the prime minister, lifted legislators’ immunity, and took over executive powers. He claimed his “emergency measures” were constitutional based on his own interpretation of article 80 of Tunisia’s constitution. That article grants the president the power to take such measures if he believes that the state is in imminent danger. The same article, though, dictates that such a step can only be enacted after consultation with the parliament and should last for only one month after which new elections should be held. The president’s opponents say he consulted no one!
President Saied took nearly two months to appoint a new prime minister, Najla Bouden, who until hours before her appointment was completely unknown—an outsider just like the president himself. On Oct. 11, Bouden and her new cabinet were sworn in before the president. But this will not solve Tunisia’s difficult problems. This is a government that lacks constitutional legitimacy and was formed outside of parliament, opening the door for more legal and constitutional fights.
In neighboring Libya, 2021 brought some consolation and hope as the U.N. mediating mission succeeded in forging a national government that won a parliamentary vote of confidence last March only to lose it on Sept. 21. But, the mediation efforts also produced a roadmap that will ultimately lead to legislative and presidential elections scheduled for Dec. 24. Haftar, still a major player in Libya’s politics, is attempting to recycle himself into a civilian leader and is likely to run for president in December. His chances of winning are modest at best.
Although, the U.S., its allies and regional countries are supporting the election plan this time, inside Libya not everyone is happy. Indeed, the parliament has passed two important laws governing both presidential and legislative elections. In the new law, the legislative elections are to take place 30 days after the presidential poll in December. This is causing friction among the different political camps in Libya, particularly between the parliament and the Higher Council of State. The council, a consultative body, has rejected both laws claiming they were passed without consultations. Despite this, no impact is expected on the agreed election date.
Yet, everyday life gets more difficult for the average Libyan as prices keep skyrocketing, the rollout of COVID-19 jabs is slow, and the country’s infrastructure is all but collapsing after a decade of wars and neglect.
As 2021 draws to a close, both Tunisia and Libya are facing similar problems, including structural issues, corruption and, above all disputes about power sharing, resource distribution and good governance—essentially continuing transitional issues. Tunisia’s economic hardships are further complicated by the fact that the country depends on foreign aid, tourism and international loans and while cash is not a problem for oil-rich Libya, the continuing unrest harms both.
What is really striking is how Tunisia, the only fledgling democracy to emerge from the 2011 upheavals in the region, ended up in more or less the same situation as its eastern neighbor, Libya. Although Tunisia avoided the violence which consumed Libya, both countries are today more divided than ever on how to proceed.
Given both countries’ histories and politics since independence over five decades ago, Tunisia is more likely to move forward despite its economic difficulties. Its democratic experiences are deeply rooted and supported by a long history of organized unions led by the strongest union organization in the region: the Tunisian Labour Union. The union even won the Nobel Peace Prize back in 2016 for its reconciliation work that helped the country avoid turbulent months marred with political disagreements and security threats that have plagued Libya.
Libya lacks all that and has, over the last decade, failed to make any breakthrough in terms of state building, reconciliation, accountability and, above all, security. Militias still roam the country and vested interests are still active behind the scenes while corruption is completely out of control. The Dec. 24 elections will go ahead, but whether Libyans will accept the outcome is another story.
While Tunisia is likely to end its internal political disturbances at the ballot box, the same may not be true for Libya and could well trigger another round of violence wiping out the little gains made so far.
Mustafa Fetouri is a Libyan academic and freelance journalist. He is a recipient of the EU’s Freedom of the Press prize. He has written extensively for various media outlets on Libyan and MENA issues. He has published three books in Arabic. His email is mustafafetouri@hotmail.com and Twitter: @MFetouri
